BLACKMAIL: AN AFTERWORD
JAMES LINDGRENt

The struggle to understand blackmail is a struggle for the soul
of the criminal law. Is the criminal law efficiency-based or moralitybased? Is it based on harm or exploitation? What constitutes
coercion? All these problems are explored in this Symposium on
blackmail. I believe that the ultimate contribution of these papers
will reach far beyond the confines of blackmail. They represent a
significant step on the road toward understanding coercion in a
broader sense than that which prevails in the philosophical
literature, and toward seeing exploitation as a principle competing
with harm as a basis for the criminal law.
This Symposium collects papers on blackmail by economists,
philosophers, and theorists of the criminal law. They were
presented at a conference at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School on January 29, 1993.1 The problem they tackle is one of the
most elusive intellectual puzzles in all of law-the paradox of
blackmail. Why doesn't the law allow you to threaten to take an
action that you have a moral and legal right to take while seeking
something that you have a moral and legal right to seek? For
example, I commit blackmail if I seek ajob or money by threatening
to expose a crime or extramarital affair. Why do two rights make
2
a wrong?
Reading the articles, I am struck by the playfulness, creativity,
and enormous analytical abilities of the participants. Indeed, I
chose to write an afterword rather than a foreword because I didn't
want to accept the responsibility for introducing such an illustrious
group of participants and articles to the world. The authors can
speak far more eloquently for themselves-and probably more
accurately. I feel a bit like the little man who follows after a parade,
cleaning up after the elephants.
Relieved of the normal responsibility of introducing the articles,
I can now indulge myself in an idiosyncratic analysis of the issues
t Norman and Edna Froehling Scholar, Professor of Law, and Associate Dean for
Faculty Development, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Leo Katz,
Wendy Gordon, Rick Matasur, and the Marshall D. Ewell Fund.
1 The conference was conceived by Leo Katz and me and sponsored by the
University of Pennsylvania Law School and its Law Review.
2 SeeJames Lindgren, Unravelingthe Paradoxof Blackmail, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 670
(1984).
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that brought out the strongest responses in me. Despite the
unusually high quality of the papers, one common line of argument
seems unwarranted. A large number of the papers, both moralitybased and efficiency-based ones, seem to assume that the information that is the subject of blackmail wouldn't be released without the
incentive for blackmail. This assumption is necessary for some
moral theorists to find blackmail coercive and for some economic
theorists to find blackmail wasteful. But the empirical claim that
the information otherwise wouldn't get out is probably false. This
questionable assumption leads to a related problem in some
papers-the assumption that blackmail is coercive in the sense of
limiting options. Perhaps the most interesting contribution of this
conference (found in Leo Katz's paper in particular) is the doubt
raised that blackmail-and the criminal law in general-is based on
coercion in the option-limiting Nozickian sense. Perhaps restricting
the victim's legal options is just one kind of coercion.
In this Afterword, I will defend my own theory of blackmail,
which is both the most complimented and the most criticized of the
theories discussed in the Symposium. I would like to say that every
good thing said about my theory is true and that every bad thing
said about my theory is false; I would like to say that, but I can't.
I won't bore readers with a point-by-point answer to all charges.
Rather, I will cover the more interesting and challenging criticismscriticisms that illustrate both how far we've come and how far we've
left to go.
I. MORALS
In the first two articles, Leo Katz and George Fletcher offer the
comforting suggestion that the crime of blackmail isn't so strange
after all. Katz argues that, in other areas of the criminal law, we
have no problem criminalizing the harms that defendants do to
their victims, even if the victims choose the harm. Fletcher argues
that blackmail involves domination by the blackmailer over his
victim, the most traditional of reasons for making behavior criminal.
In Blackmail and OtherForms of Arm-Twisting, Leo Katz makes the
case for a moral approach to the criminal law. Undoubtedly, his
major contribution is the solution he offers to what he terms the
"punishment puzzle." If, as in blackmail, someone adds to the
victim's choices, how can he be said to have done a wrong? Katz
answers this puzzle by proceeding through several examples from
other areas of the criminal law to show that we punish someone for
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the underlying wrong they do even when they give the victim an
additional option. For example, assume that a thief who breaks in
to steal some jewelry beats the victim rather than robs him because
the victim prefers that course. There is no problem here in
punishing the thief for battery. Katz is on to something important.
Even someone who is increasing a victim's options may be coercive
in a larger sense of threatening or doing harm. Nozick's definition
of coercion is too narrow to catch the full range of what the
criminal law counts as coercion, including the kind of coercion
present in blackmail.
Katz and I part company over his solution to the paradox. Katz
assumes that what the blackmailer threatens to do is immoral. But
this merely assumes away the paradox, which is in part that often
what the blackmailer threatens to do is a moral right. Exposing a
serial killer or a tax evader is almost always a good thing, not a
moral wrong. Other actions are not clearly right or wrong: telling
a woman friend that her husband is cheating on her, or reporting
a worker for being late to work. What's wrong is to threaten to take
money for silence.
Consider two variations of the following situation: A worker
comes late to work and misses an important meeting, a lapse for
which she might or might not be fired:
Variation 1. The worker's supervisor threatens to report her to
higher management unless she comes to work on time every day
for the next six months and does her job exactly as the supervisor
requests. The result: No Blackmail.
Variation 2. The supervisor makes the same threat unless she pays him
$50. The result: Blackmail.
In the first situation, the threatener uses the firm's leverage for the
firm's gain-hence, no blackmail. In the second situation, the
threatener uses the firm's leverage for individual gain, hence,
blackmail. This misuse of other people's leverage for personal gain
seems to me to be the heart of blackmail. Yet contrary to Katz's
theory, the disclosure itself would be neither right nor wrong.
Unless one accepts some version of this theory concerning misuse
of other people's leverage,3 I think that it's hard to distinguish these
two situations.

' For a long excerpt presenting this theory in this Symposium, see James
Lindgren, The Theoy, Histoy,and Practiceofthe Bribery-ExtortionDistinction,141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1695, 1705-07 (1993).

1978

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 141:1975

These examples also pose problems for George Fletcher's theory
of blackmail, presented in Blackmail: The ParadigmaticCrime. In his
domination explanation for blackmail, Fletcher seems to have
accurately caught part of blackmail, but I think that one still needs
to distinguish permissible domination from impermissible domination. In the first (legal) variation above, the dominance seems to be
greater than in the second (illegal) variation. Indeed, the supervisor's commission of a crime in Variation 2 gives the worker countervailing power over the supervisor.4 What distinguishes these two
variations isn't the degree of domination, but rather the misuse of
employer leverage. It's not that Fletcher is wrong. It's just that his
5
analysis may be incomplete.
In A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail, Scott Altman is clearly on the
right track. He sees blackmail as being based on exploitation and
coercion. I agree. Although my theory had based blackmail on (1)
wrongful gain and (2) coercion or a threat, Altman is far clearer
than I was on the presence of both elements. While I see coercion
as being much broader and vaguer than he does (almost any threat
of harm will do), I see exploitation as being much narrower (only
threats of unlawful harm and the misuse of leverage count in
blackmail). I do disagree with Altman's claim, made more absolutely by others, that "[w]ithout the opportunity to negotiate, most
blackmailers would not reveal the information."6
And, as he
admits, where information would have been released anyway,
blackmail isn't coercion in his sense.
4 Even ifthis weren't a crime, the act would still be immoral because of the misuse
of the employer's leverage for personal gain.
'Fletcher also correctly distinguishes two similar situations-if someone who might
embarrass a politician during a campaign accepts a payoffto go away, it isn't criminal,
while someone who threatens to stay and embarrass the politician unless paid off
commits blackmail. If the latter example is in fact criminal, the reason Fletcher gives
is the right one. One involves domination (or at least a threat). The other doesn't.
Where Fletcher goes awry is his suggestion that my theory can't handle this
distinction because both involve bargaining with someone else's chips. What he,
DeLong and Altman appear to have overlooked is that my theory of blackmail first
requires a threat. Admittedly, in my 1984 article, I didn't spend much time analyzing
that element, quickly moving to the main question: "The problem is to distinguish
legitimate threats from illegitimate ones." Lindgren, supra note 2, at 702. Yet I
further distinguished legitimate examples of receiving money to help conceal
information from blackmail, because "Without a threat or coercion, blackmail has not
been committed." Id. at 706. My theory has always required a threat or coercion of
some sort, which is comparable to Fletcher's domination requirement.
6Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theoty of Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1641
(1993).
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Sidney DeLong's and my article in this Symposium are virtual
mirror images of one another. I look at bribery law to show that
the same misuse of other people's chips that I think explains
blackmail is present in bribery. Thus, what seems a weak normative
argument for criminalizing blackmail may be nearly as strong as the
normative arguments for criminalizing other misuse-of-leverage
crimes: bribery, commercial bribery, payola, and insider trading.
DeLong's paper, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second
Paradox, stands my argument on its head, and represents to my
mind the most powerful challenge to my blackmail theory to date.
He agrees that bribery involves the same use of other people's chips
as blackmail, but draws the opposite conclusion. If both voluntary
payoffs to individuals and blackmail involve the same wrong, then
why are many voluntary payoffs to individuals not criminal? The
answer to the question may lie in coercion or the threat, the
element of my original theory that I didn't analyze and that some
commentators seem to have overlooked in their criticisms. That
area is where further work most needs to be done. 7 DeLong
suggests that the crucial distinction is who is the real initiator or
actor, the person knowing the secret or the person paying to
suppress it. One wonders how he fits the many cases in which
8
bribes are solicited.
One of DeLong's odder arguments is that my theory is incomplete because, supposedly, my theory can't explain the following
situation:
[I]n order to protect his mother's feelings, a son pays a menace
who threatens to expose his father's marital infidelity to his
mother. The victim, the son, is not exposed to any leverage by his
mother, who cannot use the information in any way to harm him.
Nor is the son acting as an agent 9on behalf of his father to protect
him from his mother's leverage.
It is certainly true that I didn't try to explain this case (nor has
anyone else who I'm aware of). But, since my theory involves a
blackmailer who insinuates himself into a potential dispute that is
7 Perhaps the philosophical distinction that I raise for public official extortion
applies in the private sphere. See Lindgren, supra note 3, at 1695. Bribes become
criminal when they buy unfairly positive treatment (such as perjured or no testimony).
Private blackmail involves threats to make the victim worse off than she is now worse
off than she expects to be, or worse off than she deserves to be.

8 See id. at 1703 n.28.
9 Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers,Bribe-Takersand the Second Paradox,141 U. PA.
L. Rv. 1663, 1681 (1993).
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less his than someone else's, I would think that my theory would do
a particularly good job of explaining such cases. Although my
language would have to be slightly altered to reflect the odd
situation, I had concluded in 1984 that
[w]hat makes his conduct blackmail is that he imposes himself
parasitically in an actual or potential dispute in which he lacks a
sufficient direct interest. What right has he to make money by
settling other people's claims?
... Under my theory, blackmail is the seeking of an advantage
by threatening to press an actual or potential dispute that is
primarily between the blackmail victim [here the victim's mother
for whom the son is acting as agent] and someone else. The
blackmailer turns someone else's power.., to personal benefit.
The bargaining is unfair in that0 the threatener uses leverage that
1
is less his than someone else's.

Although DeLong has come up with a new wrinkle in fact situations,
an exploitation theory should be able to handle it fairly easily.
Wendy Gordon does her usual dazzling job of playing with some
of the ironies and inconsistencies in our thinking about blackmail.
In Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, she
takes a decidedly moral approach, bringing deontological thinking
to bear. She argues that resistance to evil is a fundamental virtue.
She explores, as does Judge Posner, the counter-leverage problem.
By committing the crime of blackmail, the blackmailer gives his
victim counter-leverage that strengthens the victim's hand in
bargaining. Gordon also brings her intellectual property work to
bear by pointing out that both the criminal law, and more commonly the tort law, recognize invasions of nontangible, nonproperty
interests--assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
interference with prospective advantage, and New York's prima
facie tort.
Russell Hardin's Blackmailingfor Mutual Good chides me and
others for jumping from the description of particular judgments
about cases to conclusions about the morality of blackmail. Hardin,
a utilitarian philosopher, argues that: "We must go to the larger
institutional level to grasp the full implications of a rule of law for
11
the general incentives it produces and other effects it may have."
10 Lindgren, supra note 2, at 702-03.

11 Russell Hardin, Blackmailingfor Mutual Good, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1788
(1993).
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Most philosophers of the criminal law are not so instrumentally
driven as Hardin. Further, if one takes the standard idea that the
criminal law is based on harm plus wrongful intent, I think that
whether something counts as harm often turns on whether it's
wrong. One can't always know whether a law leads to harmful
consequences without simultaneously knowing whether those
consequences are unfair or wrong. My method is that of the
analytic philosopher-trying to carefully explain what's in the
concept, what's not, and why borderline cases are borderline
12
cases.
With considerable sophistication and insight, Hardin explores
blackmail bargains for mutual advantage, suggesting that perhaps
they ought not to be criminal. In keeping with his overall approach
to establishing the criminality of behavior, he's not sure of the right
answer, for he believes that the right answer turns on how things
work out in practice.
Hardin also finds blackmailing in the public interest to be
difficult to explain. His example is the threats by prosecutors in the
Spiro Agnew case to remove him from the line of succession should
President Nixon resign or be impeached. My "chip" analysis would
explain this use well. To the extent that prosecutors need public
leverage for public benefit, there is no blackmail. With his
consequentialist approach, Hardin serves as a transitional figure to
the second group of contributors-the economists and their fellowtravelers.
II. ECONOMICS
In Blackmai4 Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, Richard Posner
takes up, expands, and alters his brief 1975 treatment of blackmail
in The Private Enforcement of Law,1 3 co-authored with Bill Landes.
I have always liked Posner's theory better than most of the others
(except my own), despite our different world views. Both of us see
someone who threatens to expose criminality or tortious behavior
as trading on leverage that properly belongs to others. Where we
differ most substantially is in the treatment of threats to expose
voluntary immoral, but not illegal behavior. There I use the same
12 For an example of this mode of reasoning, see the Cambridge philosopher,
JOHN WILSON, THINKING WITH CONCEPTS (1963).
Is William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The PrivateEnforcement of Law, 4J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-44 (1975).
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leverage theory, but Posner takes several other approaches to try to
explain this type of blackmail. I think that he sacrifices descriptive
and conceptual accuracy to try to get a stronger normative explanation of harm, while my theory sacrifices normative strength for
conceptual accuracy. With more honesty than most of the rest of
us can muster, he admits that his arguments against this form of
blackmail are "hardly conclusive." 14 But then, neither are the
arguments for decriminalizing it.15 Posner is also one of the few
theorists who recognizes the importance of gossip in spreading
information.
We are particularly fortunate to be publishing for the first time
Douglas Ginsburg's seminal article on blackmail, Blackmail: An
Economic Analysis of the Law. Ginsburg presented the article publicly

in 1979, but for whatever reasons, refrained from publishing it until
now. Nonetheless, Ginsburg's article stimulated me to first write
about blackmail in the fall of 1981 (published in 1984)16 and
Richard Epstein to write his blackmail article in 1982 (published in
1983). 17 It may have also influenced Ronald Coase in his 1988
article,' 8 though Coase had first introduced Ginsburg to blackmail
while Ginsburg was Coase's student in law school. Ginsburg argues
that allowing blackmail would encourage the waste of resources in
digging up dirt only to suppress it or at least promote wasteful
bargaining with no net social gain. I have examined Ginsburg's
article in some detail elsewhere, 19 but he has added an epilogue
here that refines his argument further to close most (but not all) of
the gaps I identified. Where we ultimately disagree is in our
assumptions about whether threats of disclosure would tend to be
carried out, except to increase one's reputation for doing harm.
Ginsburg looks to the costs of publicity rather than the psychic
benefits, and concludes that people would remain silent.
In An Economic Analysis of Threats and their Illegality: Blackmai4

Extortion, and Robbery, Steven Shavell provides the most careful and
thoughtful analysis in the literature of bargaining incentives in
blackmail. He brings in some of the fascinating literature on how
to make threats credible, particularly in repeat bargaining. And,
14

Richard A. Posner, Blackmai, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L.

REv. 1817, 1835 (1993).

15 See id.
16 See Lindgren, supra note 2.
17 See Richard Epstein, Blackmai4 Inc., 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 553 (1983).
18 See Ronald H. Coase, Blackmai 74 VA. L. REV. 655 (1988).
19 See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 694-97.
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unlike many other contributors to this Symposium, he assumes that
the direct cost to a blackmailer of actually carrying out his threat is
ordinarily trivial. He doesn't argue that the information that is the
subject of blackmail would be likely to be exposed in any event, but
he comes close. His discussion of incentive effects suggests that, if
blackmail were legal, resources would be wasted by individuals solely
to protect their privacy even from inadvertent exposure and
subsequent blackmail.
Joseph Isenbergh, in Blackmail From A to C, uses Coasean
analysis to ask who has the highest value for the information.
Normally, in a world of positive transaction costs, one should assign
a right to the one who would value it most. This follows because
transaction costs will usually be too large to lead to optimal
bargains. He tentatively argues for a different scope for blackmail:
blackmail bargains to suppress information about crimes or torts
would be criminal, while bargains to suppress information about
other information would be allowed. I am always skeptical about
the wisdom of proposals to decriminalize classic blackmail situations. But, showing his usual creative liveliness, Isenbergh makes an
interesting case for increased bargaining over information to allow
it to pass to its highest-paying use. Oddly enough, Isenbergh draws
the opposite conclusion from Shavell's about the increased
precautions that a blackmail victim might take to guard her own
privacy if blackmail were legal. Shavell views these as wasted
precautions, while Isenbergh argues that when A is likely to be the
lowest cost-avoider of untoward disclosure, there is no obvious
reason to protect A from bearing the full cost of preserving his own
secrets. " Thus, contrary to Shavell, Isenbergh concludes that
increasing the victim's incentives to guard his own privacy would
represent an efficiency gain.
In Blackmail as PrivateJustice,Jennifer Gerarda Brown analyzes
the potential increase in criminal law enforcement that might result
from allowing the blackmail of criminals. Certainly, if we ask
whether we have enough deterrence of crimes, too much, or too
little, the answer is too little. She examines, and ultimately
tentatively rejects, an affirmative defense in a blackmail prosecution
that the victim had committed a crime. Note that this is the
opposite of the possible scope of the law suggested by Isenbergh; he
examines a proposal that would leave threats to expose crimes as
blackmail, but allow threats to expose noncriminal, nontortious
indiscretions. Also, as Shavell points out, the blackmailer may exact
a far smaller punishment than the state, which might make bounties
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paid to informers more efficient in setting the proper level of
punishment than legalizing blackmail. Brown ultimately rejects her
proposal on moral rather than economic grounds. She argues that
the fear is not that blackmail precludes public justice or reduces the
quantity of public involvement. Rather, Brown asserts that the
concern is that we fundamentally alter the quality ofjustice when we
take enforcement away from a public audience.
III. PROBLEMS
A. Waste, Coercion, and What Would Happen in the
Absence of Blackmail
Several theorists in this Symposium assume that, in the absence
of a possibility for a blackmail bargain, the damaging information
wouldn't be released, while other theorists assume that the
information would be released. Those who assume nondisclosure
argue that the blackmailer has nothing to gain besides increasing his
reputation as someone who carries out his threats (which flows only
from the chance of bargaining) and may incur costs in disclosing
information. If the bargain involved information that wouldn't be
released, then the bargain would become merely manipulative,
pointless, and wasteful. And it would restrict rather than expand
the victim's options.
Yet damaging information often passes in explicit markets for

information, such as tabloids, and most damaging information that
doesn't implicate the gossiper passes by gossip: Many classic kinds
of blackmail are of the type that people frequently gossip
about-extramarital affairs or homosexuality. It isn't costly to pass
this information and the gossiper either receives gossip in return or
gets pleasure by seeming to be knowledgeable about an issue the
hearer wants to know about. Gossip is understandable in economic
terms much as one would understand paying to attend a sporting

event. What the person gets in return is pleasure. Occasionally, a
gossiper is doing a good turn by informing those who would want
to know of a crime or indiscretion before deciding to deal with the
subject of the gossip. And the release of information isn't limited

to gossip. When an employee I supervise makes an error, I may or
may not tell the administration about it. I wouldn't consider it
gossip if I did. The information may or may not be passed. But it
would be blackmail if I threatened to expose the information unless
paid off.
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The assumption that damaging information doesn't otherwise
pass leaves me wondering how all the embarrassing acts I read
about in my daily newspaper happen to get there. Most informants
are not paid and are not repeat blackmailers. If the hope of
blackmail bargaining is the primary trigger for releasing damaging
information, how does the damaging information get out? The
information gets out because people talk.
Perhaps some insight into the motivation for gossiping or
releasing information can be gleaned from adapting an explanation
20
from a different source, George Orwell's essay, Why I Write.
Putting aside monetary reasons, Orwell admits why he writes:
1. Sheer egoism. Desire to seem clever, to be talked about,
to be remembered after death, to get your own back on grown-ups
who snubbed you in childhood, etc[.] etc. It is humbug to pretend
that this is not a motive, and a strong one. Writers share this
characteristic with scientists, artists, politicians, lawyers, soldiers,
successful businessmen-in short, with the whole top crust of
humanity ....
2. Aesthetic enthusiasm ....
3. Historical impulse. Desire to see things as they are, to find
out true facts and store them up for the use of posterity.
4. Political purpose-using the word "political" in the widest
possible sense. Desire to push the world in a certain direction ....
My starting point is always a feeling of partisanship, a
sense of injustice. When I sit down to write a book, I do not say
to myself, "I am going to produce a work of art." I write it
...

because there is some lie that I want to expose ....

Looking back through the last page or two, I see that I have
made it appear as though my motives in writing were wholly
public-spirited.... One would never undertake ... [writing a
book] if one were not driven on by some demon whom one can
neither resist not understand. For all one knows that demon is
21
simply the instinct that makes a baby squall for attention.
Among Orwell's motives for producing some of this century's great
literature are several reasons that may explain less lofty activities
such as gossip: the desire to feed an ego, to seem clever, to be
20 George Orwell, Why I Write, in 1 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND
LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 1 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Nagus eds., 1968).
21 Id. at 3-7.
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talked about, to see things as they are, to find out the truth, to push
the world, to reveal injustice, to expose a lie, and ultimately, to
squall for attention. If an economic theory is not rich enough to
accommodate such motivations, then I don't think that it will
persuade blackmail to yield up its mysteries.
By assuming without warrant that damaging information doesn't
pass without a hope of blackmail bargaining, some economic
theorists are able to conclude that the money spent on bargaining
produces no net gain and is thus wasted. But if the information
would have passed anyway, then the bargain appears efficient. Each
party gains from the blackmail bargain and their gains more than
offset the bargaining costs. Their net gain would normally become
society's net gain. The wrong for at least this kind of blackmail
must lie elsewhere.
Moral theorists who make the same questionable assumption
about information not passing argue that blackmail is coercive in
that it reduces rather than enlarges the victim's choices, since
release wouldn't have been within the expected outcomes. This line
of argument seems designed to fit their theories within the large
literature built on Robert Nozick's theory of coercion, a literature
that usually posits that coercers limit their victims' choices. 22 If
one rejects the empirical assumption about information release as
implausible, then I think one is faced with a dilemma. Either
blackmail isn't coercive or most of the traditional definitions of
coercion are too narrow. I choose the latter.
Perhaps a broader definition of coercion could be constructed

out of the principle that I believe describes the lay conception of
public official extortion. Coercion by words usually involves a
threat to make you worse off than you are now, worse off than you
expect to be, or worse off than you deserve to be. It has three
baselines. Such a definition would lead to calling many innocent

threats coercive (e.g., to foreclose on a mortgage), but when
coupled with a misuse of other people's leverage, it would describe
blackmail well. Perhaps within this larger definition of coercion,

one would need an additional reason for making something illegal,
such as limiting victims' options or blackmail in my sense.
22 See generally Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969);
Peter Westen, 'Freedom" and 'Coercion':. Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.
REV. 541 (reviewing a large number of baseline explanations for coercion and
suggesting his own two-baseline theory).
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B. DescriptiveAccuracy of Theories
I am skeptical of theories that would take ordinary kinds of
blackmail and make them noncriminal. Several theories in this
Symposium take this approach, if only tentatively. The most
common exception urged is the one for market-price blackmail. If
the blackmailer asks only for what he could sell the information to
others, then he has, according to some theorists, not committed
blackmail. An example is People v. Fox, 23 where a blackmailer was
convicted of threatening to release damaging information to a wife
in a divorce action unless the husband paid what the wife was
willing to pay. This seems like classic blackmail, yet some theories
would exclude it because it doesn't fit their theories. Given the lack
of agreement over the rationale for blackmail, I tend to think that
it's the theory rather than the law that's inadequate.
A related problem is the argument, all too common in law and
economics, that behavior that's efficient (or moral) and behavior
that's inefficient (or immoral) must both be made criminal because
it would be too costly (or difficult) to separate the two. This
argument is theoretically possible and almost impossible to
disprove, but I am skeptical of this kind of argument for two
reasons. First, in criminal law, where defendants can face twenty
years in prison, the state usually spends the money to determine
whether what the defendant did was right or wrong. The state
could provide the defendant with an affirmative defense, for
example, that he stumbled over the information or would have
released it anyway, if those facts negated the wrong or waste of
blackmail. Even if having such a defense would encourage other
bad behavior in other cases, that's usually not a sufficient reason to
punish this defendant, who has done nothing wrong under their
theories.
Second, I am skeptical of the argument about the difficulty of
sorting good cases from bad because it allows any result to fit the
theory. If a crime fits the theory, fine, the theory explains it. If the
crime doesn't fit the theory, it's too close to behavior that fits the
theory to be worth sorting out. Thus, when a theory explains any
outcome, a thing or its opposite, then the theory actually explains
nothing. Any data fits the theory and the theory predicts either
outcome. I am not asking that theories be perfect, and I may have
321 P.2d 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
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been too dismissive upon finding defects in the past, but substantial
nonfit for a serious crime is a reason for grave concern.
CONCLUSION:

TOWARD COERCION

I have no idea where this Afterword leaves you, but I can tell
you where it leaves -me. I think that the economic theories have
considerably closed the gap between the crime of blackmail and
their theoretical explanations. Under some theories, for example,
perhaps the only remaining unexplained set is casually or inadvertently acquired information that the blackmailer would expose even
without the incentive for a blackmail bargain. The blackmailer
might have someone who would pay for the information or it may
be information that usually passes by gossip-an extramarital affair
or homosexuality. Here the bargain benefits both parties and the
social waste of the bargaining costs isn't obvious. Possible explanations for this kind of blackmail might lie in the precautions that the
victim might take or a broader economic theory that credits pain
and anxiety. 24 Some theories which assume that private information wouldn't be released without the incentive for blackmail or that
market-price blackmail ought to be allowed, however, strike me as
highly questionable in that regard.
Among the moral theories, I hope I will be forgiven for thinking
that my original theory still stands as the most robust explanation
for blackmail. I am glad to see several of the theories tending
roughly in the same direction, even as they criticize various features
of my analysis. My original view of my theory is that it's a description of a concept in which is embedded a weak normative argument.
Although others reading this Symposium may conclude otherwise,
this Symposium has strengthenedmy conviction that it's descriptively accurate. Yet the Symposium has increased my doubts about its
already weak normative claims.
In my view, blackmailers threaten their victims with harm and
use other people's leverage for their own gain. While neither may
always be wrong in itself, the combination is wrong. That neither
is always wrong may raise what Sidney DeLong calls the second
paradox of blackmail. The papers in this Symposium show the need
to flesh out the coercive part of a theory-a threat, domination,
24 Even a theory based on anxiety may need an analysis of chips to explain why
mortgage lenders or injured rape victims may cause great pain and anxiety in the
people they threaten without committing a crime or tort.
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initiation by the threatener, or simply coercion. Unfortunately, the
most systematic examinations of coercion here have tended to
assume that a blackmailer restricts a victim's chances rather than
expands them. If that were so, then blackmail bargains would be
merely manipulative, pointless, and wasteful. But again, if as seems
likely, the information would often have been released even without
the possibility of a blackmail bargain, then we need a different
definition of coercion. I suspect that the key to a solution may lie
along the road that Leo Katz takes, explaining how a criminal who
increases a victim's options and follows a victim's preferences may
still be punished for what he has done.
At the end of the day, then, blackmail looks less strange,
paradoxical, or inexplicable than in the morning. Yet the papers
suggest that much work is yet to be done on the nature of coercion.
Perhaps a better understanding of coercion would unravel the
mysteries of blackmail-or a better understanding of blackmail would
unravel the mysteries of coercion. It is to that quest that this
Symposium is dedicated.

